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# REVIEW OF THE STATE OF THE BRITISH NATION.

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Thursday, July 3. 1707.

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**I** Am now come to the second Part of the reciprocal Duty of the respective Nations and Parties in *Britannia* upon the Consequence of the Union, and that is, as it respects Civil Government.

My Argument, why we should behave well in this Case, will not be drawn either from Religion, tho' Obedience to the Laws of the Land are a Part of the Duty of the Subjects, as they are Christians—But I am rather desirous to talk to the Politick Capacities of the People before me, than to the Matter as it becomes a Religious Duty.

The Civil Government of *Britannia* is every Mans Security, 'tis every Mans Blessing, and 'tis every Mans Debt both to himself and his Posterity to preserve it. Now pray, Gentlemen, how shall the Civil Government be settled, supported and upheld? How shall the Hearts of Subjects be united

to their Monarch, and brought to embrace the general Interest of the Nation, when they are not united one to another? How shall the Peace and Prosperity of the Publick be secured; if private Peace be not the Foundation; if we are not joyning our Interests, and joyning our Hearts, and joyning our Hands, how shall we be able to joyn our Forces, how shall we guard our Sovereign, defend our Laws, protect our Commerce, or guard our Liberties, if we are not united in Affection, Interest, Expectation, and Defence?

How shall one Nation be govern'd by one Prince, and form'd into one Constitution, if we be not of one Mind? How can we stand upon one Foundation, uphold one general Interest, and be one united Kingdom, if we are not one in Interest, one in Affection—and one in Desire? Will you contradict

contradict the Words of our Saviour, and pretend, *a Kingdom divided against it self shall stand?*

With Respect therefore to the Support of Civil Government and Universal Politie, it is absolutely necessary we should have Civil Peace — And here, Gentlemen, after all Her Majesty has said to us from the Throne, I cannot be suppos'd to have Room to say much — But I think there is something to be touch'd at, which Her Majesty has not thought needful to mention to you, / I dare say, the QUEEN could not think any of her Subjects defective in their Duty,) viz. There are but too many among us, who really would have no Civil Government at all, and if these need a Word of Exhortation with Respect to themselves, or Detection with Respect to others, I hope, I shall not intrench upon what any Body has said before me, nor enter upon a needless Work.

'Tis hard to say, People would have no Government at all; but what shall we say to some People, whose Genius leads them to be Malecontents and Murmurers in every Reign, quarrelling with Laws, Magistrates, and all that espouse them; Let them be of what Principle they will? Or what shall we say to another Sort of People, who will bear with no Government but Tyranny,

and yet will not bear Tyranny neither; that hate Liberty, and yet fly out at Tyranny: that love not to be tyranniz'd over, but yet love to be Tyrants themselves?

These are some of the principal People I have to do with; they were the Tools of Tyrants in former Reigns; they prompted all the Encroachments upon the Lives and Liberties of these People in either Nation; they shared the Plunder, and took the Spoil of their Neighbours, and no Man knows to what Length they would have ran, had not Providence and the Change of Scenes put a Check to them — Well, in their Turn they came to be pinch'd, and they were the first that flew in the Face of their Master, tho' the Lords anointed too, as much as any one they had pretended to serve.

By their Resistance, Force, and calling in foreign Aid; they are delivered, their Tyrant abdicated and depos'd, and now they are the disaffected Persons again, and cry for a Tyrant again — But it is, that they may have a hand in the Matter again; may devour and destroy again; that is, they would have a Government and no Government: These are the People I am now to consider, I shall use them very gently, I shall say a little of them, and a little to them, and so call another Cause.

## MISCELLANEA.

**I**N our last *Miscellanea*, I answer'd the Question, What if a Battle in Flanders should happen, and we should be worsted? what if a Ramillies or a Blenheim should go against us there — And I have advanced this Notion of my own, how it may correspond with other Peoples, I know not — I say, we are not on the same Foot with France as to Victory; if four such Victories, as we have gain'd, had been gain'd against us, as the Confederacy then stood, we had been all broke to pieces, England had been driven to her wooden Walls, to defend her Coasts from the Descents of the victorious French; and those that have cry'd up these wooden Walls, as an Equivalent to a good Army a-

broad, would soon have seen their ridiculous Notions, of England's being able to defend her self against all the World, without the Help of Confederacies and Allies, fatally confuted.

And here by the Way, for I cannot omit it; the matchless Conduct and undiscouraged Gallantry of King William cannot but be remembred, who had to do with whole and unbroken France; that SUN of War in his full Strength shining in his Meridian Glory, who always inferior in Strength, and labouring with invincible Difficulties, weak, impotent and uncertain Allies, late and deficient Supplies at home, and constant, defeated Enterprizes; bought, sold, betray'd, disap-

disappointed, and frequently beaten, yet kept the Sword in his Hand, kept the Enemy from our Doors, and play'd with the greatest Skill a losing Game.

'Tis now the French Turn to do the same, and I must own, they do it with strange Resolution; who would have expected to see France in the Field, as early, as strong, as numerous as the Confederates; 80000 Men in the Field in Flanders, besides Garrisons; thirty thousand Men on the Rhine, 4 or 5 Armies in Spain; and all this in one Winter, after such a Summer as he had last Year; after losing three such Articles in one Year, as *Barcelos*, *Ramellies* and *Turin*; in all which I cannot doubt, but kill'd, taken Prisoners, and deserted, he lost above 100000 Men.

Well, Gentlemen, such an Enemy we have to do with, and 'tis an excellent Argument to quicken both the Courage and Diligence of the Confederacy, for he must be beaten again before the Work is done; but this is by the Way.

I am now to second what I advanced last Day, viz. that a Loss on our side, and a Loss on the French side, has this visible Difference, viz. A Loss on our side will only protract the War, and adjourn the Peace; a Loss on the French side will hasten the Peace, reduce him to the last Extremity, and perhaps quite ruin him. 'Tis said, that when the Duke de Villeroy saw the French Troops broken at *Ramellies*, and that he had brought up all his Reserves, and could not stand the Shock, he stood speechless for some time; and then casting his Arms abroad in a Rage of Grief, cry'd out, *Voilà le France à Perdre, France is lost*—And indeed he had Reason to think so—But should such another Battle be lost, I believe, the King of France himself would say so too; but I come to illustrate what I say by two Instances just in View, I mean the Battle of *Turin*, and the Battle of *Almanza*; in these two Cases, the Differences between the State of the French Affairs, and those of the Confederates, is particularly seen.

In Italy, no sooner is the great Battle of *Turin* fought, and the French Affairs overthrown there, but they immediately prepare to abandon Italy, to save their Forces,

and withdraw into their own Territories, like the Animal Spirits to the Heart.

On the other hand, what is the Language of the Confederates on the Loss of the Battle of *Almanza*, nothing but hiring of Transports, shipping of Stores, stopping the March of Troops to Naples, sending Forces from all Parts; and in short renewing the War, redoubling our Force, and succouring King Charles; of which I shall come more particularly to speak in its Turn.

Here now is the true Difference of the Circumstances of the French, and the Confederate Armies, and this would be the Case exactly, in the Matter of a Loss in Flanders; and if the French please to make the Experiment, I believe, I may very safely appeal to the Consequence.

Till therefore I see farther into this Part of the War, I have done with that Question; I firmly believe, the French will not fight, if it be possible to avoid it, nor are the Boasts and Rhodomontades spread about of their Resolution to stand a Battle, at all an Argument against my Opinion, but rather for it; there are a great many Evils answer'd by making an Appearance for fighting; such as encouraging the Soldiery, trying their Spirits, making observations on their Temper, and keeping up their discouraged Hearts; such as amusing the Enemy, and by bold Marches keeping them in constant Expectation of Battle, and so prevent their undertaking any Siege, or making any great Attempt.

And indeed in this Case the French have some Advantage in Flanders; in that the Confederates have all the open great Towns in *Brabant* and *Flanders* to cover, which if they should push into the the French Conquests, unless the French can be forced to fight, those Towns will be abandon'd to the Mercy of the French, and therefore the Confederates can make no remote Attempt in Flanders, unless they can either force the French to fight, or are strong enough to divide their Army; and covering *Brabant* with one Army, advance upon some Expedition with the other.

This is apparent, in the first Step the Armies took in Flanders this Year, whe  
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